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FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE SILENCE OF THE AUDITORS 
 
Abstract 
 
Against the backdrop of the current financial crisis, this paper seeks to stimulate 
debates about contemporary auditing practices. It notes that many financial enterprises 
have sought state support within a short period of receiving unqualified audit opinion. 
Auditors collected large amounts in audit and non-audit fees. The events raise 
questions about the value of company audits, auditor independence and quality of 
audit work, economic incentives for good audits and the knowledge base of auditors.  
 
 
 3
Introduction 
 
External audit is promoted as a trust engendering technology (Power, 1999) to 
persuade the public that capitalist corporations and management are not corrupt and 
that companies and their directors are made accountable. In an uncertain world, 
corporate audits are expected to produce comfort by reassuring the stakeholders that 
the technology “provides an external and objective check on the way in which the 
financial statements have been prepared and presented, and it is an essential part of 
the checks and balances required … Audits are a reassurance to all who have a 
financial interest in companies” (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992, p. 36).   
 
Accountants, as auditors, have cemented their status and privileges on the basis of 
claims that their expertise enables them to mediate uncertainty and construct 
independent, objective, true and fair accounts of corporate affairs. This expertise, it is 
claimed, enables markets, investors, employees, citizens and the state to limit and 
manage risks.  Such claims, however, are precarious as measures of revenues, costs, 
assets, liabilities and profits are contested technically as well as politically and also 
because capitalist economies are inherently prone to crises (O’Connor, 1987). The 
claims of expertise are frequently punctured by unexpected corporate collapses, frauds 
and failures. Such events fuel the suspicions that auditors lack the requisite 
independence, expertise and incentives to construct the promised ‘true’ and ‘fair’ 
account of corporate affairs. They also provide an opportunity to reflect and 
(re)construct the role of auditing in contemporary society. 
 
At the time of writing (December 2008), major western economies are going through 
a deepening financial crisis, given visibility by banking failures and massive state 
intervention to rescue ailing financial institutions. Against the backdrop of increasing 
economic turbulence, this paper seeks to stimulate debates about the quality of 
auditing by examining the audit reports issued on the financial statements of 
distressed financial enterprises. It consists of three further sections. The next section 
contextualises the financial crisis and shows that a large number of enterprises have 
collapsed within a short period after receiving unqualified audit reports. Auditors also 
received large amounts of fees from distressed enterprises. The second section offers 
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reflection on the role of auditors and suggests possible areas of research. The final 
section briefly summarises the paper. 
 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND AUDITORS 
 
A salient feature of the current financial crisis is that it has been incubated by the 
financialisation of western economies, most notably the US economy, which created 
an abundance of credit and encouraged excessive risk-taking through complex 
financial instruments (derivatives, credit default swaps) and corporate structures and 
ineffective regulatory mechanisms (Ferguson, 2008; Morris, 2008; Soros, 2008). 
Banks, hedge funds and insurance companies have been key actors in the 
financialisation of the economy and are estimated to have lost around US$2.8 trillion 
(Bank of England, 2008).  
 
The social cost of the unfolding crisis is difficult to estimate, but vast amounts of 
public money are being used to prop-up distressed financial enterprises. For example, 
in addition to providing huge sums to stimulate banking liquidity, the UK government 
has set aside £500 billion (about US$750 billion) to support financial enterprises (The 
Guardian, 8 October 2008). It has closed London Scottish Bank, nationalised 
Northern Rock and is taking a stake in a number of other banks. The US government 
has closed twenty-two banks1, including Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual and 
Indymac. It has rescued Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns and created a bailout 
fund of $700 billion to purchase stakes in troubled banks (Los Angeles Times, 4 
October 2008). Altogether the US government has committed nearly $8.5 trillion, 
around 60% of its gross domestic product, to arrest the collapse of its financial system 
(San Francisco Chronicle2, 26 November 2008). The European Central Bank has 
provided around €467 billion to support banks. Germany has set aside over US$400 
billion to bailout ailing banks (Wall Street Journal, 11 October 2008). So far, Ireland, 
Iceland, Hungary and Turkey have sought financial assistance from the International 
                                                 
1 As per information on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); 
http://www.fdic.gov/index.html - accessed on 25 November 2008. 
2 http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/11/26/MNVN14C8QR.DTL; 
accessed 26 November 2008. 
 5
Monetary Fund (IMF) to manage the crisis (The Guardian, 21 October 2008, 29 
October 2008, 20 November 2008). 
 
Regulators and investors have traditionally relied upon corporate financial statements 
to make sense of bank liabilities, risks and economic exposure, but this has been 
highly problematic (Stiglitz, 2003). An early estimate suggested that despite a raft of 
accounting standards, banks had around US$5,000 billion of assets and liabilities off 
balance sheet (Financial Times, 3 June 2008) though this figure is being constantly 
revised. Citigroup alone has some US$1.23 trillion of assets in entities which are not 
shown on its balance sheet (Wall Street Journal3, 24 November 2008). Some banks 
have shown assets, especially subprime mortgages, at highly inflated values and 
derivatives have long been a “powerful tool for inflating company profits by hiding 
losses and hence the risks of company operations” (Hildyard, 2008, p. 30). The chief 
executive of a leading financial advisory business argued that a “big part of the 
problem is that accounting rules have allowed banks to inflate the value of their 
assets. Accounting has become a new exercise in creative fiction, with the result that 
banks are carrying a lot of "sludge" assets clogging up the balance sheet” (Reuters4, 
30 October 2008).  
 
Attention has focused on auditors because of the belief that “a green light from an 
auditor means that a company’s accounting practices have passed muster” (New York 
Times, 13 April 20085). Table 1 shows that distressed financial enterprises, whether in 
the UK, USA, Germany, Iceland, The Netherlands, France or Switzerland, received 
unqualified audit opinions on their financial statements published immediately prior 
to the public declaration of financial difficulties. These opinions were provided by one 
of the Big Four accounting firms - PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte & 
Touche (D&T), Ernst & Young (E&Y) and KPMG. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
                                                 
3 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122747680752551447.html; accessed 24 November 
2008. 
4 http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-CreditCrisis/idUSTRE49T77O20081030; 
accessed 30 October 2008. 
5http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/business/13audit.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
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Admittedly, the list in Table 1 is incomplete, but it is useful for highlighting a number 
of issues. Adverse “key financial ratios” are considered to be an indicator of going 
concern problems (Auditing Practices Board, 2004a), and major institutions acquired 
leverage ratios in the range of 11:1 to 83:1 (Gros and Micossi, 2008). Excessive 
leverage has the potential to increase liquidity risk and jeopardise bank survival. For 
example, a report by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) noted that 
Bear Stearns “was highly leveraged, with a gross leverage ratio of approximately 33 
to 1 prior to its collapse” (US Securities Exchange Commission, 2008, p. 19). One 
expert informed the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform that Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank, “had a 
leverage of more than 30 to 1. With this leverage, a mere 3.3% drop in the value of 
assets wipes out the entire value of equity and makes the company insolvent6”.  
 
The UK auditing standards, closely aligned with international auditing standards, state 
that the “auditor’s procedures necessarily involve a consideration of the entity’s 
ability to continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future. In turn that 
necessitates consideration of both the current and the possible future circumstances of 
the business and the environment in which it operates” (Auditing Practices Board, 
2004a, p.8). Auditing standards also require auditors to “perform audit procedures 
designed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that all events up to the date 
of the auditor’s report that may require adjustment of, or disclosure in, the financial 
statements have been identified“ (Auditing Practices Board, 2004b, p. 3). How the 
auditors constructed audits to satisfy themselves that banks were a going concern are 
open to conjecture, but the financial difficulties of many became publicly evident 
soon after receiving unqualified audit reports. 
 
For example, Lehman Brothers received an unqualified audit opinion on its annual 
accounts on 28 January 2008, followed by a clean bill of health on its quarterly 
accounts on 10 July 2008. However, by early August it was experiencing severe 
financial problems and filed for bankruptcy on 14 September 2008. Bear Stearns, 
America's fifth largest investment bank, received an unqualified audit opinion on 28 
January 2008. However, by 10 March its financial problems hit the headlines and on 
                                                 
6 http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081006103223.pdf; accessed on 14 
November 2008. 
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14 March, with state support, it was sold to JP Morgan Chase (US Securities 
Exchange Commission, 2008; The Guardian 15 March 2008). Carlyle Capital 
Corporation received an unqualified audit opinion on 27 February 2008. On 9 March, 
the company was known to be discussing its precarious financial position with its 
lenders. On 12 March, the company announced that it “has not been able to reach a 
mutually beneficial agreement to stabilize its financing" and was placed into 
liquidation (cited in Sikka, 2008a). Thornburg Mortgage, America's second-largest 
independent mortgage provider received an unqualified audit opinion on 27 February 
2008. On March 7, the company "received a letter, dated March 4 2008, from its 
independent auditor, KPMG LLP, stating that their audit report, dated February 27 
2008, on the company's consolidated financial statements as of December 31 2007, 
and 2006, and for the two-year period ended December 31 2007, which is included in 
the company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for 2007, should no longer be relied 
upon" (cited in Sikka, 2008a). 
 
Table 1 shows that in many cases, auditors provided non-auditing services and this 
inevitably raises the age-old question about auditor independence. The issues were 
flagged by the US Senate Committee’s report on the collapse of Enron (US Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002) and revisited by the UK House of 
Commons Treasury Committee report on Northern Rock. The Committee stated that 
“there appears to be a particular conflict of interest between the statutory role of the 
auditor, and the other work it may undertake for a financial institution” (UK House of 
Commons Treasury Committee, 2008, p. 115).  
 
Table 1 also shows that auditors received considerable income from their audit clients, 
which may be very significant for regional offices managing the audit. The fee 
dependency and related advancement of career can create conflict of interests. The 
insolvency examiner of New Century Financial Corporation, America’s second 
largest subprime mortgage lender, stated that the company was “engaged in a number 
of significant improper and imprudent practices related to its loan originations, 
operations, accounting and financial reporting processes. … KPMG engagement team 
acquiesced in New Century’s departures from prescribed accounting methodologies 
and often resisted or ignored valid recommendations from specialists within KPMG. 
At times, the engagement team acted more as advocates for New Century, even when 
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its practices were questioned by KPMG specialists who had greater knowledge of 
relevant accounting guidelines and industry practice” (United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District Delaware, 2008, p. 2, 6 and 8). 
 
Concerns about auditing practices have been amplified by a number of commentators. 
A former minister in Ireland has described auditors as a “joke and a waste of time. 
They are lick-arses for the management of companies, because corporate governance 
doesn’t work in our society … the banks are in difficulty because of their auditing”. 
[Auditors] “are not independent but they are bloody-well paid” (Irish Times7, 18 
October 2008). One commentator asked “What's the point of having armies of number 
crunchers on fancy fees if they cannot spot the difference between a shack in Alabama 
and a triple-A security?” (The Daily Telegraph8, 22 October 2008). Another 
commentator wondered, “… did the so-called Big Four accountancy firms get paid by 
the banking industry to make all those sub-prime assets seem like they had value? 
Who was kicking the tyres and checking the inventories? Surely someone, somewhere 
with a degree in Adding-Up must have peered into the loan book and questioned its 
contents?” (The Daily Telegraph9, 17 September 2008). However, unlike the previous 
banking failures (Arnold and Sikka, 2001) auditors have received comparatively light 
press scrutiny although the US authorities are said to be investigating allegations of 
fraud (The Daily Telegraph, 24 September 2008).  Some have argued that “the crisis 
may not result in criminal charges against auditors, but it is certain to renew interest in 
how accountants conducted themselves” (New York Times, 13 April 200810).  
 
Some Issues 
 
                                                 
7 “Firms 'have case to answer' on banks crisis”, Irish Times, 18 October 2008 
(http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/1018/1224233216915.html; 
accessed on 28 October 2008). 
8 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeffrandall/3212394/If-anyone-can-
find-George-Osborne-tell-him-his-country-needs-him.html; accessed on 24 October 
2008. 
9 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeffrandall/2972337/Fantasy-finance-
cuts-many-of-the-giants-of-global-banking-down-to-size.html; accessed 28 October 
2008. 
10http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/business/13audit.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
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The financial crisis raises some old and new questions about auditing practices. 
Traditionalists have often claimed that external audit adds credibility to financial 
statements. Such claims may be based upon the view that auditors have ‘inside’ 
knowledge and are thus able to curb management enthusiasm and impart superior 
information. The difficulty with such a hypothesis is that the current financial crisis 
shows that markets and significant others were not comforted by unqualified audit 
opinions issued by major auditing firms. For example, the 2006 financial statements 
of Northern Rock, UK’s fifth largest mortgage provider, carried an unqualified audit 
opinion. On 25 July 2007, the bank’s interim accounts for six months to 30 June 2007 
received a positive report from its reporting accountants. However, this did not 
prevent a run on the bank during August and September (UK House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, 2008). Indeed, within days of receiving unqualified audit 
opinions many banks listed in Table 1 were seeking financial support from the state. 
Overall, little is known about how credibility to accounts is added and at whose 
behest, especially as audit evidence is not available to the general public. It would be 
useful to explore how confidence in auditing is eroded and the circumstances that 
persuaded significant others to ignore auditor assurances. 
 
The issuing of audit reports is subject to organizational and regulatory politics. 
Auditors may be reluctant to qualify bank accounts for fear of creating panic or 
jeopardising their liability position. During previous banking failures legislators 
argued that auditor silence “caused substantial injury to innocent depositors and 
customers” (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1992, p.4). To reassure 
markets and promote confidence in financial institutions, the UK government has 
enacted the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It formalises exchange of 
information between auditors and regulators. It also requires auditors to inform the 
regulators if during the course of their audit they become aware of anything that 
materially affects the regulator’s functions of consumer protection and maintenance of 
market confidence (Auditing Practices Board, 2007). Within this context, auditors are 
obliged to inform regulators of their intention to issue a qualified audit report. 
Whether auditors did so or were dissuaded from issuing qualified opinions is not 
known. The politics of audit opinion beg questions about the value of an audit. They 
draw attention to power relations and ideologies that shape regulation of capital. 
Perhaps, in the coming months parliamentary  inquiries will address such matters. 
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Researchers  might  also consider mobilising the freedom of information laws to 
explore the relationship between the state and accounting firms. 
 
Auditors may argue that the financial crisis unfolded suddenly and they were thus ill-
prepared to make judgments about the likely financial distress. The difficulty with 
such an argument is that finance capitalism has been in ascendancy (Ferguson, 2008) 
and played a leading role in the banking crises in Latin America (Collyns and 
Kincaid, 2003), Sweden, Norway and Japan (Englund, 1999; Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. 2004). The US experienced a Savings & Loan crisis (Lowy, 
1991) and Fannie Mae has a history of accounting and auditing problems (US Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, 2006). The collapse of the UK based Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was the biggest banking failure of the 
twentieth century (Arnold and Sikka, 2001) and the demise of Barings attracted 
considerable international attention (Zhang, 1995). Previous episodes have 
highlighted issues about earnings management, income shifting, excessive leverage 
and failures of conventional auditing technologies. Yet regulators have paid little 
attention to changes in capitalism and emerging issues (Sikka et al., 2007). It would 
be useful to explore the lessons that can be learnt from recent scandals and 
transformations in the nature capitalism. 
 
Auditing firms received considerable income from all distressed banks, which may be 
significant for local offices responsible for issuing audit opinions. This raises two 
questions. Firstly, there are long standing questions about auditor provision of non-
auditing services and the related impairment of auditor independence (US Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002; Powers Jr. et al., 2002; UK Department 
of Trade and Industry, 1976, 1979). As a result of scandals, some restrictions have 
been placed on the sale of consultancy services to audit clients (for example, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002), but the change is always resisted. When, in the aftermath 
of the nationalisation of Northern Rock, the UK House of Commons Treasury 
Committee (2008) expressed its concerns about the provision of consultancy services 
to audit clients, the immediate response from the Auditing Practices Board (APB), 
UK’s auditing standard setter, was that “After Enron we consulted on this question of 
auditor conflicts of interest and there was no appetite for a blanket ban on non-audit 
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services” (Accountancy Age11, 7 February 2008). The APB is dominated by the 
auditing industry (Sikka, 2002). Seemingly, control of regulatory bodies is an 
important resource in organising unwelcome developments off the political agenda, 
especially when they have the potential to dilute firm income (Sikka, 1992). It would 
be useful to examine the politics of regulatory change and particularly the tactics used 
to resist and dilute auditing reforms. 
 
The second question relates to the basic auditing model and total auditor income. The 
auditing firms are capitalist enterprises and are dependent upon companies and their 
directors for income. The fee dependency impairs claims of independence and has the 
capacity to silence auditors (Powers Jr. et al., 2002; United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District Delaware, 2008). It poses fundamental questions about the private 
sector model of auditing which expects one set of capitalist entrepreneurs (auditors) to 
regulate another set of capitalist entrepreneurs (company directors). The flaws of such 
a model persuaded an earlier UK Conservative government to create an independent 
statutory body for appointment and remuneration of auditors for public bodies 
(Heseltine, 1987). The auditors, including the Big Four accounting firms, are 
generally prohibited from selling consultancy services to audit clients. The proponents 
of such a model hoped to extend it to the private sector, but this was not done. The 
flaws of the private sector model were also recognised in the US in the 1930s and the 
draft legislation creating the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed 
that the Commission should be the auditor for public companies12. However, under 
the weight of corporate lobbying the proposal was abandoned. The current financial 
crisis is an opportunity to consider alternative institutional arrangements for auditing. 
Alternative models need not directly involve accounting firms and audits of banks 
could be conducted by statutory regulators. This would also improve banking 
regulators’ knowledge of banks. 
 
Audit reports are the publicly visible evidence of an audit. However, little is known 
about the processes and organisational values associated with their production of an 
                                                 
11 http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/analysis/2209088/rock-failure-
casts-shadow-3792762 
12 Corporate Crime Reporter 8, February 14, 2007 
(http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/turner021407.htm; accessed on 24 
November 2008).   
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audit. Such processes involve management of labour, economic incentives and images 
of clients, public and regulators. Some prior literature has provided a glimpse of the 
ingredients used to produce audits. For example, Hanlon (1994) argues that audit staff 
are inculcated to appease clients and neglect wider social interests. In pursuit of 
profits, firms exert time budget pressures on audit personnel and some have responded 
by adopting irregular practices and even resorting to falsification of audit working 
papers (Willett and Page, 1996). Auditing firms have shown increasing willingness to 
violate laws, regulations and assist their clients to publish flattering financial 
statements (Sikka, 2008c). Arguably, a steady stream of auditor liability concessions 
have also eroded economic incentives to deliver good audits (Sikka, 2008b). In the 
words of a former senior Vice-President of the World Bank, “there are plenty of 
carrots encouraging accounting firms to look the other way … there had been one big 
stick discouraging them. If things went awry, they could be sued … In 1995, [US] 
Congress … provided substantial [liability] protection for the auditors. But we may 
have gone too far: insulated from suits, the accountants are now willing to take more 
“gambles” … (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 136). The above literature draws attention to inherent 
contradictions in the design of audits and also offers research opportunities for 
exploring the production of audits through examination of regulatory reports, court 
cases, case studies, oral histories and a variety of social science methodologies. 
 
The intensification of finance capitalism poses questions about the knowledge base of 
auditors. For over a century auditors have utilised methods of an industrial age in 
which tangible things could be examined, counted and measured and their values 
could be checked from invoices and vouchers. Such a world has been eclipsed by 
complex financial instruments (e.g. derivatives) whose value depends on uncertain 
future events and can be anything from zero to several million dollars/pounds. 
Derivatives were central to the collapse of financial and non-financial businesses such 
as Barings (Zhang, 1995), Enron (Powers Jr. et al., 2002; US Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 2002) and Parmalat (The Times, 17 March 2004). The US 
government bailout of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) showed that even the 
Nobel Prize winners in economics had difficulties in valuing derivatives (Dunbar, 
2000). It is doubtful that auditor knowledge surpasses that of Nobel Prize winners. 
Seemingly, we have reached the limits of conventional auditing technologies and 
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ought to be considering alternative forms of accounting, disclosures and 
accountabilities. 
 
Summary  
 
The deepening financial crisis poses questions about the role and value of external 
audits. Markets do not seem to have been assured by unqualified audit opinions and 
many financial institutions either collapsed, or had to be bailed out within a short 
period of receiving unqualified audit opinions. The events fuel the suspicions that 
auditors lack the claimed expertise to render an independent and objective account of 
corporate affairs. The episodes encourage reflection on the role, value and 
independence of auditors. They also present opportunities for research into regulation, 
independence, politics, production and knowledge base of auditors.   
 
An independent inquiry into the role of auditing, especially at financial institutions, 
would help to highlight the shortcomings of the current practices. A UK legislator has 
accused accounting firms of delivering “dodgy auditing” (Hansard, House of 
Commons Debates, 13 October 2008. col. 553) and demanded “a full scale inquiry 
into the conduct of the audit work that signed off the banks’ accounts” (Accountancy 
Age13, 23 October 2008). Unsurprisingly, such calls are resisted by major auditing 
firms (Accountancy Age14, 13 November 2008) though they are using the crisis to 
demand further liability concessions15 and increase their profits. The auditing 
regulators have shown little interest in exploring the issues raised in this paper and are 
content to claim that “auditing has had a good crisis16”, i.e. it has received little 
sustained press scrutiny.  
 
                                                 
13 http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/analysis/2228834/overhaul-
auditing-banks-4299027; accessed 27 November 2008. 
14 http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/comment/2230322/auditing-
profession-review; accessed 30 November 2008. 
15 http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2218842/frc-appeals-
watchdog-auditor; accessed 27 November 2008. 
16 Speech by Paul Boyle on 23 October 2008 
(http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/Mansion%20House%20Speech%
20October%202008%20-%20published1.pdf; Accessed 24 October 2008). 
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The auditing industry has mediated previous crises by revising auditing standards and 
codes of ethics (Sikka and Willmott, 1995) and the early signs are that the same 
strategies will be deployed again. For example, without examining the processes 
associated with the production of audits, changes in capitalism, or limits of auditing, 
the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB17) has issued seven 
new draft auditing standards18.  Such myopic policies are unlikely to reinvigorate 
auditing. 
 
                                                 
17 This was part of the post-Enron reforms enshrined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
18 http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/News/2008/10-21.aspx; accessed on 22 
October 2008. 
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TABLE 1 
 
       Year    Date of  Audit   Fee (Millions)  
Company  Country End  Auditor Audit Report  Opinion Audit Non-Aud  
 
Abbey National UK  31 Dec 2007 D&T  4 Mar 2008  Unqualified £2.8 £2.1 
 
Alliance & 
Leicester  UK  31 Dec 2007 D&T  19 Feb 2008  Unqualified £0.8 £0.8 
 
Barclays   UK  31 Dec 2007 PwC  7 Mar 2008  Unqualified £29 £15 
 
Bear Stearns  USA  30 Nov 2007 D&T  28 Jan 2008  Unqualified $23.4 $4.9 
 
Bradford & Bingley UK  31 Dec 2007 KPMG  12 Feb 2008  Unqualified £0.6  £0.8 
 
Carlyle Capital 
     Corporation Guernsey 31 Dec 2007 PwC  27 Feb 2008  Unqualified N/A N/A 
 
 
Citigroup  USA  31 Dec 2007 KPMG  22 Feb 2008   *Unqualified $81.7 $6.4 
 
Dexia   France/ 31 Dec 2007 PwC  28 Mar 2008  Unqualified €10.12    €1.48 
   Belgium     + 
      Mazars & Guérard 
 
Fannie Mae  USA  31 Dec 2007 D&T  26 Feb 2008  Unqualified $49.3       --- 
 
Fortis   Holland 31 Dec 2007 KPMG  6 Mar 2008  Unqualified €20      €17 
           + 
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       PwC 
 
Freddie Mac  USA  31 Dec 2007 PwC  27 Feb 2008  *Unqualified $73.4      --- 
 
Glitnir   Iceland 31 Dec 2007 PwC  31 Jan 2008  Unqualified ISK146      ISK218 
 
HBOS   UK  31 Dec 2007 KPMG  26 Feb 2008  Unqualified £9.0      £2.4 
 
Hypo Real Estate Germany 31 Dec 2007 KPMG  25 Mar 2008  Unqualified €5.4      €5.7 
 
Indymac    USA  31 Dec 2007 E&Y  28 Feb 2008  *Unqualified $5.7      $0.5 
 
ING   Holland 31 Dec 2007 E&Y  17 Mar 2008  Unqualified €68      €7 
 
Kaupthing Bank Iceland 31 Dec 2007 KPMG  30 Jan 2008  Unqualified      ISK421    ISK74 
 
Landsbanki  Iceland 31 Dec 2007 PwC  28 Jan 2008  Unqualified     ISK259     ISK46       
 
Lehman Brothers USA  30 Nov 2007 E&Y   28 Jan 2008  Unqualified $27.8    $3.5 
        
Lloyds TSB  UK  31 Dec 2007 PwC  21 Feb 2008  Unqualified £13.1 £1.5 
 
Northern Rock UK  31 Dec 2006 PwC  27 Feb 2007  Unqualified £1.3 £0.7 
 
Royal Bank of  UK  31 Dec 2007 D&T  27 Feb 2008  Unqualified £17 £14.4 
Scotland 
 
TCF Financial Corp USA  31 Dec 2007 KPMG  14 Feb 2008  Unqualified $0.97 $0.05 
 
Thornburg Mortgage USA  31 Dec 2007 KPMG  27 Feb 2008  Unqualified $2.1 $0.4 
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UBS   Switzerland 31 Dec 2007 E&Y    6 Mar 2008   Unqualified CHF61.7   CHF13.4 
 
U.S. Bancorp  USA  31 Dec 2007 E&Y  20 Feb 2008  Unqualified $7.5  $9.6 
 
Wachovia  USA  31 Dec 2007 KPMG  25 Feb 2008  Unqualified $29.2     $4.1 
 
Washington Mutual USA  31 Dec 2007 D&T  28 Feb 2008  Unqualified $10.7     $4.3 
 
Notes: 1) Data as per financial statements and statutory filings shown on the respective company’s website. 
 2) ‘Audit fee’ also includes ‘audit related fees’ 
3) * Denotes that audit report draws attention to some matters already contained in the notes to financial statements.
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